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In the literature examining European Union external trade policy, the relative influence of the Commission, the 
member states and interest groups are an issue of ongoing debate. This article will argue that member states can 
still play an important role and that a focus on member state preferences is therefore crucial in understanding 
European external trade policy in general. An interest-based explanation of state preferences is proposed in 
which both material (political and economic) and ideational variables are included, whereas material 
explanations alone dominate the current research in the trade policy field. An in-depth case study of German 
preference formation and position taking with regard to the agricultural chapter of the GATT Uruguay Round 
(1986-1993) shows the interplay between material and ideational interest. As well as German preference 
formation being guided by Germany’s trade interests and political interests (particularly when these interests 
were united and governmental sensitivity was high), considerations concerning the Franco-German friendship, 
affecting Germany’s ideational interest, also proved to be a constant in the preference-formation process. 
Germany; European trade policy; GATT Uruguay Round; Agriculture 
 
 
 
This article investigates German preferences with regard to the agricultural chapter of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round (1986-1993) and its 
role in European Union (EU) position taking in these negotiations.1 In the literature 
explaining European trade policy, the relative influence of the Commission, the member 
states and interest groups is an issue of ongoing debate. In this article the position that, 
even though external trade policy is within the exclusive competences of the EU, 
member states still can play an important role during trade negotiations will be 
defended. In order to arrive at full and convincing explanations of EU trade policy in 
general, one therefore needs to take account of member state preferences and how 
these preferences are formed. However, research on ‘the role of individual member 
states in the formulation of EU trade policies’ and on the domestic preference formation 
processes in member states is relatively scarce (Dür and Zimmerman 2007: 777, 783). 
To the extent that trade preferences are theorised, it is often assumed that domestic 
economic variables, such as factors of production (Rogowski 1989), factor specificity 
(Frieden 1991) or the pressure of economic interests (Moravcsik 1998; De Bièvre and 
Dür 2005), are decisive in shaping state preferences on trade liberalization. When it 
comes to agricultural trade, agricultural interests in particular are expected to be 
influential (Keeler 1996). I will argue, though, that an exclusive focus on the material 
domestic sources of trade policy preferences does not only overlook the potential 
influence of external pressure on governments, but also neglects non-material ideational 
sources of these preferences. In this article, it is assumed that, in domestic preference-
formation processes, a government will take account of both its material (political and 
economic) and its ideational interests. 
German preference formation concerning the agricultural chapter of the GATT Uruguay 
Round is in this respect a valuable case to study for two reasons. First, Germany’s 
position in the negotiations is particularly interesting because, compared to the other 
European member states, it had the most internally-split preferences. While the 
industrial sector urged the government to agree to further liberalization of trade (also in 
the agricultural domain), the agricultural sector was keen on protection. Second, apart 
from these domestic pressures, the German government was under contradictory 
external pressure as well. On the one hand, the United States (US) tried to convince 
Germany to plead for trade liberalization during European decision making on the 
Uruguay Round, while, on the other, France sought German support for a protectionist 
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stance on agriculture, appealing to the long-standing Franco-German friendship. This 
article will show how these incompatible pressures and interests, through the domestic 
German decision-making process, resulted in the preferences Germany defended with 
respect to the agricultural chapter of the Uruguay Round.  
The study on the German case in itself does not provide an explanatory model of (trade) 
preference formation which is directly applicable to all other EU member states. This 
would require a larger scale comparative case study, which is not feasible within the 
constraint of this single article and would be at odds with presenting an in-depth analysis 
of preference-formation processes. It is particularly the latter that this article aims at, by 
contributing to filling the void of in-depth empirical studies on trade preference-
formation processes. Although this article does not seek to develop a theory of trade 
preference formation by EU member states in general, the German case study shows 
how different variables interact to explain trade preferences and allows the development 
of scope conditions for the relative importance of the different variables. These can 
subsequently be applied to theory formation and theory testing in a larger scale 
comparative case study of EU member state preferences. 
First, the analysis will engage in the wider scientific debate on European decision-making 
regarding external trade and the relative importance of the European Commission, 
member states and interest groups in this process. This will result in the presentation of 
the theoretical assumptions and expectations that inform the analysis of the German 
case study. Second, the article presents the case description, based on several “decision 
moments”, when GATT proposals or Commission proposals concerning the European 
position on agriculture, which needed to be defended in GATT, were on the agenda. It is 
at these moments in the negotiations that member states have to make their 
preferences explicit and the periods leading up to the definition and articulation of the 
national preferences are pre-eminently appropriate to analyse the effects of different 
variables on German preference formation.  
 
EUROPEAN TRADE POLICY AND MEMBER STATE PREFERENCES 
Commission versus member states? 
In the scholarly literature on European trade policy, the relative influence of the 
European Commission, the member states and interest groups are a matter of ongoing 
debate. With respect to the relative autonomy of the Commission as opposed to the role 
of member states, the debate in the 1990s revolved around an intergovernmentalist 
approach emphasising the power of member states (whose preferences were assumed to 
mirror those of domestic economic interest groups) (Moravcsik 1998) versus 
(neo)functionalist explanations focusing on the autonomy of EU institutions (Hayes 
1993). More recently the debate has primarily been couched in terms of a principal-
agent model. According to Kerremans (2004: 364) this model is ‘an instrument to 
understand the interaction between the Commission and the member states in the 
context of multilateral trade negotiations’. Applying the principal-agent model to 
European trade policy, the member states (the principals) delegate decision-making 
power concerning external trade policy to the EU (the agent) and subsequently try to 
keep control over this agent to prevent him from acting with too much autonomy and 
possibly against the interests of the principals (Dür and Elsig 2011: 328). 
Member states delegated the execution of European external trade policy through Article 
113 [133] of the Treaty of Rome which established the European Economic Community, 
giving the Commission the sole authority to negotiate multilateral trade agreements on 
behalf of the member states. Nevertheless, due to the role of the Council of Ministers in 
the policy process ample opportunities exist for control by member states. At the start of 
the policy process, prior to any negotiations, the Commission does not only need 
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authorisation from the Council to engage in such negotiations, but the Council may also 
issue a directive giving the boundaries within which the Commission has to negotiate 
(Kerremans 2004: 368). During the second phase of the policy process, the actual 
negotiations, member states are able to monitor the negotiations closely through the 
Article 113 [133] Committee, consisting of member state representatives (Kerremans 
2004: 369).2 Finally, at the end of the process, the Council has the sole authority to 
adopt international trade agreements — by qualified majority in areas of exclusive EU 
competence and by consensus in areas of mixed competence. In fact the consensus rule 
is applied more often than strictly required, especially when the interests of particular 
member states are ‘severely at stake’ (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 50).3 The 
Commission therefore cannot afford to ignore the preferences and demands of the 
member states during the negotiations and risk losing their support. Although the 
Commission can try to gain leverage over member states by using certain strategies 
such as divide and rule or by proposing package deals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis 
(Woolcock and Hodges 1996; Vahl 1997), agricultural negotiations, the focus of this 
study, tend to be highly politicised both in the European arena and within member 
states, which is likely to enhance the role of member states relative to that of the 
Commission (Orbie 2007: 41-42; Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 77). 
 
The influence of interest groups 
A further issue in the debate on European trade policy is the degree to which interest 
groups influence these policies through lobbying the Commission or member states. 
Irrespective of whether authors explicitly couch their arguments in terms of the 
principle-agent model or not, this debate revolves around those defending the collusive 
delegation argument and their opponents who emphasise interest group influence.4 The 
collusive delegation argument holds that states delegate decision-making authority in 
order to reduce the influence of interest groups on policy making. In this vein, Sophie 
Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis (1999: 480) argue that with respect to trade policy ‘such 
delegation helped insulate the policy-making process from domestic pressures, thus 
promoting a more liberal international order.’5 Furthermore, delegation will enable the 
member states to shift the blame for unpopular policies (Arnold 1990). An important 
assumption underlying the collusive delegation argument is that the domestic policy 
process is usually dominated by protectionist trade interests (Dür 2008: 28). The costs 
of trade liberalization are often concentrated, affecting one or a small number of societal 
interests, whereas the gains are dispersed. As a result the negatively-affected groups 
are likely to mobilise, while the consumers gaining from trade liberalization (confronted 
with a collective action problem) are unlikely to do so. Delegation thus aids member 
state governments by insulating them from domestic interest group pressure for 
protectionist trade policies. 
Those defending the interest group approach share the assumption (also implicit in the 
collusive delegation argument) that domestic politicians wish to be re-elected and will 
therefore reject policies that would result in concentrated losses for specific societal 
groups (Dür 2007: 462; De Bièvre and Dür 2005: 127). However, they repudiate the 
idea that delegation will significantly restrict the influence of interest groups. This 
expectation is simply disproved by studies showing the influence of interest groups on 
EU trade policy making in various cases (see Van den Hoven 2002; De Bièvre and Dür 
2005). Considering the EU’s institutional framework, this should not come as a surprise, 
according to Dür (2008: 30-31), because the Council’s consensus rule is also applied to 
the trade policy field. Lobbying governments will therefore still be effective and the 
Commission will take account of interest group preferences, because it realises that it 
would not be able to get member state approval if it ignored interest pressure.6 Thus, 
Van den Hoven (2002: 23) argues, interest groups in the trade field are not only 
expected to influence member states, but are also regarded as having particular 
influence on the Commission due to their legitimizing role: 
Volume 9, Issue 4 (2013) jcer.net Gerry Alons 
 505 
The Commission’s ability to represent the EU in multilateral negotiations and to 
keep member states united behind its negotiating position, largely depends on 
keeping interest groups satisfied with the concessions that it is giving and 
receiving in the WTO. 
On the level of the state, the international political economy literature often emphasises 
the domestic sources of economic policy, assuming that the preferences of domestic 
economic actors somehow translate into state preferences (see for example Milner 1988 
and Knopf 1988). Some stress factors of production (capital and labour) when explaining 
a state’s openness to trade liberalization (Rogowski 1989), while others focus on factor 
specificity (Frieden 1991). It is important to note, though, that even if one considers 
societal demands to be the primary determinants of trade policy, this does not mean 
these policies will always be of a protectionist nature. Notwithstanding the often 
concentrated losses and dispersed gains of free trade, Dür (2007) found that exporters 
tend to lobby against losses (as in terms of market shares) and will thus mobilise when 
governments propose protectionist trade policies that harm their trading interests. 
Import-competing interests therefore need not always be dominant in domestic politics. 
In the words of Dür (2007: 462), ‘As politicians thus have to find a balance between 
satisfying exporter interests and maintaining protection for import-competitors, the 
relative strength of the two constituencies would determine the extent of the initiative in 
favour of exporters.’ 
 
AN INTEREST-BASED APPROACH INCLUDING IDEATIONAL VARIABLES 
From this discussion of the scholarly debate on the relative influence of the Commission, 
member states and interest groups on European trade policy, we may first of all 
conclude that the influence of member states should not be underestimated, particularly 
in such politicised domains as agricultural trade. Secondly, and this is partly a result of 
the member states’ continued importance, interest groups still have ample opportunity 
to influence their domestic government and also — due to its wish to maintain the 
support of member states — the Commission. 
If these were the only considerations, an analysis of the preferences, mobilisation and 
strength of competing German interest groups should suffice as an explanation for 
German preferences on the agricultural chapter of the Uruguay Round. I would argue, 
however, that such an approach would neglect external (i.e. international) and ideational 
determinants of trade policy preferences and, considering the contradictory external 
pressures on Germany and France’s appeal to the Franco-German friendship during the 
GATT Uruguay Round, analysing the potential influence of such variables is crucial in the 
case under study. 
I therefore emphasise the role of governments in selecting a preferred policy option 
within constraints which are not only political in nature (e.g. farm lobby pressure).7 
Instead, I assume that a government will defend the policy option which it deems to be 
most attractive from the perspective of its political, economic and ideational interests. 
The political interest essentially covers the relative power position of a state 
internationally and the wish of the government to remain in office domestically. It is 
because of the government’s consideration of its political interest that interest groups 
are able to influence domestic preference formation and the government will particularly 
be sensitive to their pressure when elections are approaching. As regards the economic 
interest, governments strive to increase national wealth and improve living standards. 
Common explanations of states’ trade policies often are restricted to an analysis of these 
material interests. However, arguments based on political or economic interests 
frequently do not tell the whole story. They overlook the fact that, under conditions of 
imperfect knowledge of the political and economic costs and benefits of different policy 
options, political actors often rely on ideas about ‘how the world works’ and ‘who we 
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are’, also to identify the appropriate policy. Apart from material interests, I therefore 
also distinguish ideational interests, which refers to defending ideas that are central to 
the state and shape the beliefs of the state’s decision-making elite. These ideas can be 
embedded in a state’s national identity or in its policy paradigms (the principles 
underlying its policies). National identity answers the question ‘who we are’. It reflects 
‘shared norms and narratives that sustain we-ness’, distinguishing the “self” from the 
“other” (Banchoff 1999: 268), including through images of a common past or ‘collective 
orientations towards the future’ such as ‘a sense of mission in the world’ (Peters 2002: 
13-14). The national identity shapes the set of policy options deemed appropriate and 
makes some options more attractive than others. By including these ideational variables 
and their effects in the analysis of state preferences, I also respond to a common 
constructivist criticism of rational-choice analysts, which states that their models 
underestimate the influence of non-material factors on foreign policy.8 
While the German political and economic interests during the Uruguay Round can be 
analysed on the basis of the different pressures (domestic and international) that were 
brought to bear on the German government and estimates of the effects of trade 
liberalization on different sectors of the German economy, it is necessary to first identify 
relevant German policy paradigms and identity aspects relating to its position in the 
world, in order to estimate the ideational attractiveness of different policy options. With 
respect to the relevant economic policy paradigm, Germany is generally non-
interventionist and disposed towards trade liberalization. However, the agricultural 
sector is an exception (Weiss 1989). In this sector a comprehensive mix of instruments, 
ranging from subsidies to tax benefits and direct payments, is used to intervene. 
Important principles in this interventionist agricultural policy are the 
Einkommensorientierten Produktpreispolitik (Führer 1996: 22) and the bäuerliche 
Landwirtschaft (Bulletin 25.3.1987). The former emphasises high guarantee prices and 
guaranteed sales quantities, with the aim of safeguarding farm income, while the latter 
indicates the German idea of small-scale farming based on environmentally-friendly and 
animal-friendly production methods. 
Turning to the relevant aspects of German identity, Germany pictures itself as a neue 
Handelsstaat. This is a state that does not prescribe for itself a strong military role in 
international relations, but wishes to be powerful due to its economic accomplishments 
and competitiveness (Rittberger 1992: 223). Associated with Germany’s identity as a 
Handelsstaat is its prioritization of the international extension of free trade principles 
(Markovits and Reich 1991: 59). At the same time however Germany also attaches great 
importance to the Franco-German friendship (Cogan 2003). While for France the amitié 
privilégiée (Delorme 1994: 42) served geo-political goals as it made it feasible ‘to tie 
Germany into European integration by any means possible, and not to allow it to become 
an independent power’ (Haywood 1993: 278-279), the Germans have generally been 
prepared to defer to France’s wishes and hand ‘to their French counterparts the political 
leadership of Europe’ (Cogan 2003: 99). This appears to have been related to the 
German conviction that Selbsteinbindung (in Europe in this case) was necessary in order 
to ‘prevent Germany from reverting to its old ways and to guarantee peace and security 
for Germany and its neighbours’ (Van Esch 2007: 274). In terms of identity construction, 
it is argued in this respect that ‘Germany’s international identity has been constructed 
around a multilateral and European position’ (Bulmer and Paterson 1996: 18). And with 
respect to Germany’s European policy, the Franco-German relationship — and within it 
the close connection between Kohl and Mitterrand — are so essential that the 
relationship is considered an ‘institutional reflex and part of [Germany’s] identity’ 
(Bulmer and Paterson 1996: 29). Although debate erupted within Germany after 
reunification about whether Germany should continue its European and international 
policies as usual or, instead, act more unilaterally based on its potential for European 
hegemony, Germany chose to operate within the context of multilateral and EU 
institutions and continued to value Franco-German cooperation (Janning 1996; Hamilton 
1991).9  
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The Franco-German friendship has quasi-regime-like qualities, in that it entails 
(unwritten) behavioural norms (Cole 2001). With respect to issues that one or other or 
both regard as politically salient (their interests being fundamentally at stake), Germany 
is expected not to support policy options that France opposes because they are 
detrimental to fundamental French interests (even if supporting the decision would serve 
German material interests), and vice versa. In this context, Douglas Webber (1999: 48) 
states that ‘the deference shown by the one government to the other may lead it 
occasionally to adopt positions on (…) issues contrary to those dictated by domestic 
political considerations.’ Apart from influencing the preferences Germany defends in 
negotiations, deference due to the Franco-German friendship may also surface in the 
policy-making process, because the nations may refrain from putting too much pressure 
on each other on issues affecting their vital interests.  
As implicated in the quote from Webber above, it is important to note that the 
behavioural incentives based on different interests do not necessarily strengthen each 
other, but can also be conflicting. If material and ideational considerations coincide, 
ideas strengthen the (un)attractiveness of the behavioural option under consideration 
and provide the government with additional legitimacy for its position of rejecting or 
accepting the option. When ideational considerations and material incentives collide, it 
can be expected that the degree of domestic pressure and the sensitivity of the 
government (Van der Vleuten 2005) will decide whether material incentives trump 
ideational considerations or not. The greater the degree of domestic pressure and 
governmental sensitivity, the more likely it becomes that material interests eclipse 
ideational interests. 
It is this interest-based approach, including both material and ideational interests that 
will guide the analysis of German preference formation regarding the agricultural chapter 
of the Uruguay Round in the next section. As this is not the first scientific study focusing 
on the EU and agriculture in the Uruguay Round, it is important to elucidate how this 
analysis complements and can be contrasted with earlier analyses. Much of the scientific 
work on the Uruguay Round focuses on the proceedings of the talks and the role of the 
prime antagonists, the United States and the European Union, without delving deeply 
into the preference formation in separate member states (see for example Paemen and 
Bensch 1995). The research questions guiding such research instead concerns the 
autonomy of the Commission relative to member states (Vahl 1997) or the link between 
institutions (as decision-making rules within the EU) and negotiating outcomes (Meunier 
2005; Davis 2003). To the extent that these authors touch on member states 
preferences, their analyses tend to be descriptive, without problematising and explaining 
the preferences described. Notable exceptions are Keeler (1996) and Patterson (1997). 
Both authors emphasise the importance of interest groups at domestic level. Keeler 
develops a theoretical argument explaining why farm lobbies in particular are likely to 
influence state preferences on agriculture and agricultural trade. He underpins these 
theoretical claims with empirical illustrations of French and German decision making 
during the Uruguay Round. What the current article adds is an in-depth case analysis, 
partly based on primary archival records, that allows me to draw conclusions on the 
mobilisation and influence of not only agricultural organisations, but also the industrial 
lobby, which defended different preferences. Patterson (1997) aptly argues that, when it 
comes to analysing the behaviour of the EU in international negotiations, a third level 
needs to be added to Robert Putnam’s classic two-level games (1988), in order to 
distinguish between the international, the European and the domestic levels. The win set 
at domestic level would then be the set of all European level agreements that would gain 
the necessary majority in the EU member states. This coincides with the interest-based 
analysis in this article to the extent that I will analyse the preferences of competing 
German interests regarding the agricultural chapter of the Uruguay Round. An important 
difference empirically, however, is that my analysis involves preferences concerning the 
GATT negotiations rather than the negotiations over the Common Agricultural Policy, 
which is the topic of Patterson’s article (touching on GATT issues in an indirect manner 
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only). Finally, what the current article contributes to the scientific debate, as compared 
to the other publications referred to, is an analysis of the role of ideas in preference 
formation regarding trade policies. 
 
GERMAN PREFERENCES IN THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND 
1982-1986: Reaching agreement on the launch of a new GATT Round 
The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations was initiated at the beginning of the 1980s, 
during a time of international economic slowdown and increasing protectionism. 
Agriculture figured prominently on the agenda and in particular the US was keen on 
subjecting this sector to stricter GATT discipline (Davis 2003: 272-273). However, many 
GATT partners, among them important EEC member states, were not yet eager to start 
another round of GATT negotiations (Paemen and Bensch 1995: 32; Meunier 2005: 
103). In the early 1980s Germany was positively disposed towards a new round of GATT 
negotiations even though broader support for such negotiations was still lacking in the 
EEC as a whole. Due to the economic crisis at this time, Chancellor Helmut Kohl attached 
great importance to a new GATT round (Bulletin 14 October1982); and given Germany’s 
economic interests as a trading nation with a strong competitive position in the industrial 
sector, this preference seems natural. Liberalization would only be costly for the 
insufficiently competitive agricultural sector. The Deutsche Bauernverband (DBV), the 
agricultural interest group, urged the EEC to be uncompromising and prevent the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) ending up on the negotiating table (Deutsche 
Bauernkorrespondenz November 1982), but they did not oppose a new GATT round 
altogether (Bulletin 19 September 1986). At the same time industrial interests, such as 
the Bund Deutscher Industrie (BDI) and the Bundesverband des Gross- und 
Aussenhandels (BGA), mobilised in favour of a new GATT round and argued that the EEC 
should be willing to put the adverse economic consequences of its agricultural policy up 
for discussion, in order to prevent trade conflicts in other areas that could damage 
German industrial exports (Handelsblatt 5 November 1986).10 
As gains in the industrial sector were likely to outweigh losses in the agricultural sector, 
both economic and domestic political considerations, on balance, favoured German 
acceptance of a new round of GATT negotiations which included agriculture. In the 
international political domain, however, incentives were mixed. On the one hand the US 
had singled out Germany as the subject for their particular pressure, in an attempt to 
convince it to actively seek to steer European decision making towards a more positive 
position on a new GATT Round.11 On the other hand, France tried to convince the EU 
member states to reject a new GATT round and in particular to object to the inclusion of 
agriculture in GATT negotiations.12 German diplomacy and position taking during the 
run-up to the Uruguay Round between 1982 and 1986 reflect these contradictory 
pressures.  
Germany repeatedly expressed its preference for a new round of trade negotiations as a 
necessity in strengthening the multilateral trading system and as a way to restrain 
protectionist tendencies and prevent economic and political confrontations, which 
Germany, due to its dependence on exports, could not afford.13 Nevertheless, in spite of 
its own desire for a new GATT round, Germany seriously took account of France’s 
resistance to EEC participation. At a meeting of the Article 113 Committee in November 
1982 the German minister of economics, Otto Lambsdorff, did not put too much pressure 
on his French counterpart, Michel Jobert, because Germany wished to avert a clash with 
France.14 Even when, by 1984, the Commission and an increasing number of member 
states began to develop a more positive attitude towards a new GATT round, Germany 
remained careful in its attempts to convince the French of the benefits of such 
negotiations.15 Despite US requests, it did not organise a meeting between European 
trade ministers to accelerate decision making on the matter. 
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Apart from influencing German diplomacy towards France, considerations of the Franco-
German friendship also affected the German position, moving it closer to French 
demands. During a Council meeting in March 1985 the member states reached 
agreement on an EEC declaration conveying its willingness to take part in a new GATT 
round. France was able, however, to get an extensive paragraph on agriculture included, 
indicating numerous conditions and reservations on this issue. France could do this 
because it won the support of Germany during the meeting. It is claimed that the initially 
liberally inclined German position moved closer and closer to the protectionist French 
position after telephone calls between Paris and Bonn (interview Frans Engering 20 
February 2004).16 With respect to the G7 conference in Bonn in July 1985, where 
François Mitterrand refused to commit himself to a specific date for the launch of the 
new trade round, Helmut Kohl emphasised that Germany’s relationship with the French 
was particularly amicable (explicitly referring to the deutsch-französische Freundschaft) 
and that Germany and France wanted to operate in tandem.17 German diplomacy 
therefore focused on convincing the French that they, too, in the longer term stood to 
benefit most from a more open world trade system.18 The German preparatory 
documents for Council meetings provided various outlines for speeches by the German 
representative, each geared to responding to a different French position.19 German 
declarations were therefore highly dependent on the position taken by the French in the 
negotiations. 
In September 1986 a GATT Ministerial Conference was planned in Punta del Este, to 
launch the new trade round. During this meeting the EEC became isolated, because most 
of the GATT parties were willing to accept the declarations that had been proposed, while 
the EEC, under pressure from the French, was forced to withhold its support for these 
texts. France was in particular opposed to the emphasis on and explicit reference to 
export subsidies in the text (Vahl 1997: 74; Agra Europe 19 September 1986) and 
threatened to leave the negotiating table if its agricultural interests were not taken 
sufficiently seriously (United Press International 18 September 1986). Germany, for its 
part, was less concerned about the precise formulation of the opening declaration, but 
regarded the launch of a new GATT round as a goal in its own right (Handelsblatt 19 
September 1986, 22 September 1986). It made extensive diplomatic efforts and tried to 
find formulations with the aim of appeasing and convincing the French, in order to 
remove their resistance (Handelsblatt 19 September 1986). Eventually France accepted 
a compromise text, in which export subsidies were no longer explicitly mentioned and 
which included the objective of ‘increasing discipline on the use of all direct and indirect 
subsidies and other indirect measures affecting directly or indirectly agricultural trade.’ 
(Agra Europe 26 September 1986) This formulation met the French demand that 
protectionist policies of states other than EEC members would be part of the negotiation 
as well. According to German negotiators, it was due to German and US pressure that 
France eventually accepted the opening declaration. A tacit agreement existed between 
France and Germany, with the support of Kohl, that the principles of the CAP were not to 
be put up for discussion (interview Lorenz Schomerus 29 March 2007).20 
It is claimed that France eventually agreed to include agriculture in the Uruguay Round 
to prevent a ‘major break with Germany’ (Webber 1998: 37; Paemen and Bensch 1994: 
46). The German government clearly also valued the Franco-German friendship and was 
willing to make immense diplomatic efforts to gain French approval before accepting the 
opening declaration, risking deadlock even when important German economic interests 
were at stake. After the negotiations in Punta del Este, the German Minister of 
Economics, Martin Bangemann, stated in the Bundestag that with respect to agriculture 
‘Franco-German cooperation had fully stood the text’ and that he had kept in close 
contact with the French ministers of trade and of agriculture during the negotiations in 
order to develop compromise formulas.21 
The analysis presented above shows that while political and economic interests 
advocated a preference for a quick start of a new GATT round, ideational considerations 
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regarding the Franco-German friendship affected German diplomacy and position taking. 
From the start Germany made clear that it wanted a new GATT round, a position that 
resonated well with its overall economic interests and the balance of domestic 
mobilization. Nevertheless, it was willing to defend a more protectionist position on 
agriculture to placate the French, even though this could put the launch of new GATT 
negotiations in doubt and thus be detrimental to its own economic interests. During the 
negotiating process, the frequent Franco-German bilateral consultations also seem to 
indicate a collaborative reflex consonant with the Franco-German friendship. For a full 
understanding of the German preferences and diplomatic behaviour, both material and 
ideational interests therefore need to be taken into account. 
 
1990: Breakdown at Heysel 
Once the new GATT round, now referred to as the Uruguay Round, had been launched, 
the actual discussions began in 1987 in fifteen negotiating groups, including a separate 
group for agriculture (Paemen and Bensch 1995). Because of this separate treatment, 
the French and German ministers of agriculture were united in their resistance to too 
great a degree of liberalization in this sector. As long as no differential treatment of 
domestic support (German interest) and export assistance (French interest) was 
foreseen, their interests coincided. During the first half of the Uruguay Round the 
agricultural negotiations mainly focused on the form and modalities of an agreement and 
it was not until 1990 that negotiations started on actual reduction percentages for 
customs duties, domestic support and export assistance (Vahl 1997). The GATT partners 
had committed themselves to tabling agricultural proposals by October 1990. These 
would be the basis for the Heysel conference in December 1990, during which the 
Uruguay Round was originally scheduled to be completed (Paemen and Bensch 1995: 
140-141). In the run-up to this conference, the European Commission put a proposal 
before the Council of Ministers to reduce agricultural support by 30 per cent. A heated 
and protracted debate erupted. 
During this debate the German government was faced with contradictory incentives. 
Domestically, the Deutsche Bauernverband rejected the Commission proposal, which it 
equated with selling out on the notion of the bäuerliche Landwirtschaft and bowing down 
to the demands of the United States (Die Welt 8 October 1990). They argued that to 
support the reductions proposed would endanger the multifunctionality of the European 
agricultural sector and compromise community preference (Deutsche 
Bauernkorrespondenz November 1990). The farm lobby appealed to Chancellor Kohl ‘to 
wield his full power in striving for a solution in GATT that gives farmers a future’ 
(Deutsche Bauernkorrespondenz November 1990; Bulletin 18 October 1990). The 
industrial lobby, however, mobilised in favour of concessions on agriculture, in order to 
conclude the Uruguay Round as soon as possible (Die Welt 18 October 1990; Agra 
Europe 7 December 1990). In the international arena US pressure for a far-reaching 
European proposal was counterbalanced by French insistence on rejection of the 
Commission proposal on the basis of its damaging effects on community preference and 
export potential.22 
In the autumn of 1990, upcoming elections (increasing governmental sensitivity to 
domestic pressure) combined with the fact that the farming population formed an 
important part of the grassroots support for the governing coalition (Keeler 1996: 141; 
Weiss 1989: 80-81), increased the likelihood that farm pressure would decisively 
influence the German government. Elections for the Landtag in Bavaria — where the 
Christlich Soziale Union (CSU), sisterparty of the Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU), 
was highly dependent on the farm vote — and the five East German Länder were to be 
held on 14 October, and the first all-German general elections since reunification were 
scheduled for 2 December. Farmers were aware of their electoral clout and threatened 
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Kohl that he would lose their votes if he did not reject any proposal resulting in farm 
price reductions.23 
Under these contradictory pressures the German government was divided on the issue: 
the Minister of Agriculture, Ignaz Kiechle, vehemently opposed the Commission proposal, 
whereas Helmut Haussmann, the Minister of Economics, welcomed it (Frankfurter 
Rundschau 9 October 1990; Süddeutsche Zeitung 9 October 1990; BMWI 
Tagesnachrichten 17 October 1990). Kohl intervened on the side of Kiechle and it was 
decided that Germany would continue its resistance in the Council and would only accept 
such a proposal if additional measures in the form of direct income support were 
included and if community preference was guaranteed (Agra Europe 19 October 1990). 
It is argued in this respect that Kohl prevented the Ministry of Economics prevailing over 
the Minister of Agriculture, because he was very sympathetic to agricultural interests, 
appreciating not only the economic but also the social value of agriculture (interview 
Feiter 21 May 2001; interview Franz-Josef Schomerus 29 March 2007).24 Kiechle and 
Kohl both agreed that a GATT deal was important for German industry and agriculture, 
but they were unwilling to sacrifice the agricultural sector in order to reach such a deal 
(Bulletin 26 October 1990). The German preference clearly dovetailed with the position 
defended by the farm lobby. Secondary literature and media sources contend that, 
considering the upcoming elections, the CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union of 
Germany and Christian Social Union of Bavaria) could not take the risk of alienating the 
farmers (Davis 2003: 287; Paemen and Bensch 1995: 178; Agra Europa 26 October 
1990; Financial Times 29 November 1990; New York Times 13 November 1990). 
Despite German and French resistance the Commission succeeded in winning the 
support of nearly all other member states by the end of October and the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands began to put pressure on the chancellor’s office and the ministry of 
economics to accept the agricultural proposal.25 At the same time France pressed 
Germany to stand firm — fearing that Franco-German solidarity might falter because the 
Commission had met a number of German demands.26 When a watered-down version of 
the Commission proposal was on the table at the Council on 26 October, Germany 
indeed initially seemed willing to accept the compromise, until the French Minister of 
Agriculture, Louis Mermaz, indicated that the solution did not satisfy France.27 Kiechle 
then explained that Germany was not prepared to accept a proposal that was opposed 
by France (Agence Europe 29 October 1990; Agra Europe 2 November 1990; Frankfurter 
Rundschau 30 October 1990). Again, Germany risked stalemate in the Uruguay Round, 
which would be detrimental to its industrial interest, in order to support France. 
Concerns relating to the Franco-German friendship remained important during further 
European decision making on the Commission proposal. While the state secretaries’ 
committee on European affairs, in preparation for the 5 November Council meeting, 
instructed the German negotiators to accept the Commission proposal even if France 
continued to reject it,28 Kiechle did not do so during the Council meeting, but instead 
supported the French demand for ‘a more precise statement on community preference.’ 
(Vahl 1997: 137) Kohl had apparently overruled the state secretaries’ committee and the 
Frankfurter Rundschau (7 November 1990) stated ‘the directions of the chancellor for 
the German delegation to support France’s demands for protection to the end were of 
critical importance.’ Only after changes in accordance with France’s wishes were made in 
the Council declaration, did both France and Germany accept the Commission package, 
on 6 November 1990. Despite speculation that Germany would soften its stance after the 
parliamentary elections of 2 December (New York Times 10 December 1990), Germany 
held firm in its support for the French and backed its rejection of additional European 
concessions during the Heysel conference (Davis 2003: 292).  
This account shows, first of all, that farm lobby pressure effectively influenced the 
position of the government (under conditions of high governmental sensitivity) and, 
secondly, that Germany, and Chancellor Kohl in particular, valued the Franco-German 
friendship so highly, that it was willing to forego Germany’s wider material interest in 
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order to satisfy the French. It may not only have been Kohl’s personal friendship with 
Mitterrand that influenced his preferences, but it should also be noted that Germany 
needed French approval of the integration of former Eastern Germany in the EEC. 
Germany could therefore not afford to alienate its French friend. The preference 
formation regarding the Commission proposal is a good example of how material and 
ideational considerations can strengthen each other, resulting in German support for 
France and rejection of the Commission proposal 
 
1992: The US and the Commission reach the Blair House Accord 
After the collapse of the talks at Heysel, GATT Secretary General Arthur Dunkel tried to 
get the negotiations back on track by presenting a compromise agreement in December 
1991: the Draft Final Act. This could only be adapted on the basis of proposals that were 
accepted by all GATT partners. The main antagonists, the EEC and the US, now began 
negotiating bilaterally, in order to reach an agreement on agriculture. These bilateral 
negotiations intensified after the EEC reached agreement on the MacSharry reforms of 
the CAP in May 1992 and resulted in the Blair House Accord in November 1992. 
An important development that started in 1991 and continued in 1992 was that both 
within the government and across German society at large the scales began to tip in 
favour of trade liberalization in agriculture. At a cabinet meeting in October 1991 it was 
decided that Germany would now aim for a swift conclusion of the Uruguay Round and 
strive for EEC concessions on agriculture to reach this goal. Although the Minister of 
Agriculture, Kiechle, did not support this decision, he was overruled by the other 
ministers who favoured a more flexible negotiating position, and he no longer enjoyed 
the backing of Kohl, who emphasised that the failure of the Uruguay Round would be a 
catastrophe that should not be allowed to happen (Webber 1999).29 Domestically, 
societal pressure was split between a liberal coalition of industry and business lobbies, 
scientific institutes and the liberal and socialist parties on one side, and the farm lobby 
on the other. Free trade proponents blamed the agricultural sector for the deadlock in 
the GATT talks and demanded that the government overrule the narrow interests of 
German agriculture and defend Germany’s wider export interests (Financial Times 21 
March 1992; Die Welt 10 November 1992). Both the liberal and the socialist parties 
urged Kohl to put pressure on Mitterrand to reach a compromise (Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung 6 November 1992; Financial Times 5 March 1992). In the words of Bundestag 
member Wolfgang Roth, ‘we still have to get our French friends to budge in the next few 
days’ (Deutscher Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 12/112, 14 October 1992). The farm lobby, 
however, continued to oppose any concessions on agriculture, claiming that community 
preference and the multifunctionality of German agriculture had to be defended 
(Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz April 1992; May 1992; Bulletin 18 March 1992). When 
the EEC and the US reached the Blair House Accord in November 1992, the industrial 
lobby urged the government to endorse it and convince the French government to 
compromise (Süddeutsche Zeitung 24 November 1992). The farm lobby, though, argued 
that the German government should follow the French example and say no to the 
compromise (Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz December 1992). 
At this point international pressure came to the fore. While Germany, following the 1991 
cabinet meeting, began to argue for concessions on agriculture, France increased its 
pressure on Germany by appealing to Franco-German solidarity in order to win German 
backing for its own stance. It warned Germany that it would strike at the heart of 
Franco-German relation if it failed to support France.30 When the Blair House agreement 
was reached France immediately rejected it and was counting on the support of its 
German friends. French government officials claimed that, although some in the German 
government wanted to accept the compromise, the Chancellor was far more reluctant 
and sympathetic to France (Libération 14 October 1992). Considering Kohl’s prior 
refusals give in to domestic demands to put Mitterrand under greater pressure – Kohl 
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stating that ‘anybody who knows French politics should know that would be a fatal thing 
to do’ (Financial Times 24 March 1992) – the French expectation of support seemed to 
have some basis.31  
Nevertheless, in the final analysis, Germany gave its wider economic interests priority 
over its ideational interests in terms of the Franco-German friendship. The agricultural 
deal was expected to open the door to a full GATT agreement (including the agricultural 
sector), which would be advantageous to German industrial interests. Moreover, the 
costs for the agricultural sector would probably be limited, because part of the 
reductions could be met by implementing the MacSharry CAP reforms agreed by EEC 
member states in May 1992. Even Kiechle agreed that Germany should accept the Blair 
House Accord, in the interest of a well-functioning trading system. He advised Kohl not 
to reject the agreement as, with respect to agriculture, German and French interests 
differed and the government had to ask itself how far solidarity with France should be 
taken on this issue (Süddeutsche Zeitung 30 November 1992). It should therefore come 
as no surprise that Germany indeed accepted the accord (Bulletin 20 November 1992). 
The analysis above shows how its political and economic interests led Germany to accept 
the Blair House Accord in 1992. While political considerations still resulted in a 
protectionist stance in 1990, the tipping of the domestic balance of interests towards 
liberalization provided the incentive to accept the deal. The farm lobby was alone in its 
demand for rejection and even its preferential access to the governing parties could not 
counterbalance the overwhelming domestic pressure in favour of concessions on 
agriculture. In the end, political and economic considerations therefore outweighed 
Germany’s ideational interest in the Franco-German friendship. 
 
1993: From Blair House to the Final Accord 
The Blair House agreement did not result in a complete GATT deal (covering all 
negotiation domains) as swiftly as had been hoped. The (especially French) resistance to 
the agricultural agreement restrained the Commission from making further commitments 
on other negotiating issues, because a qualified majority would be required in the 
Council to approve the eventual GATT agreement dealing with all negotiating areas. It 
was clear that France was not likely to accept such an agreement unless the agricultural 
deal had been renegotiated. In 1993 Germany was in a difficult situation. On the one 
hand it wanted a swift conclusion of the Uruguay Round, but on the other it also wished 
to preserve the Franco-German friendship and therefore had to take the French demands 
for renegotiation seriously. Economic interests and the balance of political pressure 
provided clear incentives to prioritise the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Industrial 
groups maintained ‘a constant barrage of messages to Kohl’s office, urging him to finish 
the Uruguay Round without further ado’ (Paemen and Bensch 1996: 239). Proponents of 
a GATT agreement increasingly put pressure on the government not to sacrifice German 
interests for the sake of French agricultural interests and the Franco-German friendship 
(Handelsblatt 18 February 1993; 10 March1993). 
When France began to step up its lobbying efforts to renegotiate the Blair House Accord, 
industrial interest groups demanded that the German government resist these demands 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 10 July 1993). The socialist party warned that 
Germany’s reputation as a Handelsstaat was at stake (Deutscher Bundestag. 
Plenarprotokoll 12/190, 2. July 1993, 14613). What is more, all parties in parliament 
agreed that reopening agricultural negotiations would jeopardise the chances of success 
of the Uruguay Round as a whole (Handelsblatt 13 September 1993). The only societal 
interest group supporting France’s demand for renegotiation was the Deutsche 
Bauernverband (Süddeutsche Zeitung 11 September 1993). At international level both 
the US and the GATT Secretary General signalled that the Blair House Accord was non-
negotiable and that December 1993 would be the final deadline for a complete GATT 
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agreement (Swinbank and Tanner 1996: 108-109). If this deadline was not met the 
Uruguay Round would have failed. GATT partners expected Germany to intervene in EEC 
decision making, as Germany was widely seen as the only European member state that 
could convince the French (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2 September 1993; Die Welt 
11 September 1993). Germany’s reputation as a Handelsstaat was therefore at stake. At 
the same time, however, Germany was faced with increasing pressure from the new 
French government to support its demand for renegotiation.32 France also sent a 
memorandum to its European partners, shortly before to the Council meeting in 
September 1993 at which a decision was to be taken on the matter.33 Although its 
government had hitherto been reluctant to make explicit references to any use of the 
veto by France, it became clear in September that a French veto was still considered a 
genuine possibility. If France were indeed to veto the complete GATT agreement the 
result would be disastrous for Germany.34 
Considering its varying interests, the German cabinet agreed that reaching a GATT deal 
should be Germany’s priority and that renegotiation of the Blair House Accord would 
probably not be to its advantage (Bulletin 27 February 1993). Klaus Kinkel, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, argued: ‘When it comes to supporting the French, we have reached 
the limit. We really need to arrive at an agreement now.’35 It was considered that the 
last chance to reach an agreement was in 1993 (BMWI Tagesnachrichten 21 June 1993). 
Prior to bilateral talks between Mitterrand and Kohl in August 1993, Kohl was therefore 
advised not to make any concessions on the GATT issue (Paemen and Bensch 1995: 
239; Handelsblatt 31 August 1993). 
Nevertheless, at the press conference after his meeting with Mitterrand and Balladur, 
Kohl stated that Germany also had problems with the Blair House agreement and that 
cooperation was needed to reach a solution (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2 
September 1993; Der Spiegel 6 September 1993). The German ministers were puzzled 
by Kohl’s statement and immediately emphasised that the German position with respect 
to Blair House had not changed (Agra Europe 27 August 1993). Germany sought to 
distance itself from any suggestion that it might join France in demanding a 
renegotiation of the accord (Agra Europe 3 September 1993). However, both the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chancellor’s office had now become concerned that 
France was prepared to cause a European crisis over the issue. They therefore preferred 
to placate the French as much as possible, without endangering the GATT negotiations.36 
As a result Germany agreed to consultations with France on the matter and called on 
other European member states to take French concerns seriously (Agra Europe 3 
September 1993; Wirtschaftswoche 17 September 1993). In preparation for the Council 
meeting on 21 September the Germans signalled that they would not agree to a 
renegotiation of the Blair House Accord, but were amenable to bilateral talks between 
the US and the EEC on how it was to be interpreted (Agra Europe 10 September 1993). 
At the Council meeting, Germany therefore agreed to authorize the Commission to enter 
into consultations with the US to seek “clarification” of the agreement (which in practice 
entailed renegotiating it) (Webber 1998: 55). Germany was willing to go a long way to 
get France onside, provided that doing so would not endanger the successful conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round (interview Lorenz Schomerus 29 March 2007). Ludewig, one of 
the German negotiators, said that although Kohl did not provide them with actual 
mandates on this matter, those close to him knew his position — ‘be nice to the 
agricultural people, be nice to the French, but do not put the Uruguay Round at risk.’ 
(interview 5 April 2007)37 
An important question then is how we should explain Kohl’s actions in the whole process. 
Some argue that Kohl supported the French in August 1993 because he had become 
convinced that the French government would fall if the Blair House Accord was not 
renegotiated and that the French would rather use their veto in European decision 
making than end up facing a governmental crisis at home (Webber 1998: 52;). Another 
explanation could be that Kohl was responding to pressure from the German farm lobby, 
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which did not like the Blair House agreement either. However, considering the 
overwhelming domestic mobilisation against renegotiation and in favour of a swift GATT 
deal, it is highly unlikely that farm lobby pressure would have been decisive. Officials 
involved in the negotiating process agree that Kohl’s stance can only be explained by his 
wish to do something for the French, because of the value he attached to the Franco-
German friendship and his personal relations with Mitterrand.38 France claimed its vital 
interests were at stake and requested German support. Furthermore, on issues other 
than the Uruguay Round, Germany was in need of French support. A monetary crisis had 
broken out in the European Monetary System in the summer of 1993 and Germany 
needed cooperation from France in the Council of Ministers to push through additional 
support measures benefiting German agriculture.39 It is claimed that the French were 
skilful in connecting the two issues, to put Germany under additional pressure to back 
the French demands over the GATT negotiations (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 10 
September 1993). There was further speculation that Germany had agreed to 
“clarification” of the Blair House agreement in exchange for French support not only 
regarding its agrimonetary concerns, but also its wish to see the European Central Bank 
located in Frankfurt (Agra Europe 24 September 1993; Financial Times 30 September 
1993). 
The new talks between the Commission and the US on the agricultural agreement 
resulted in some (minor) additional concessions by the US on 6 December 1993. A Final 
GATT Accord (covering all the negotiating areas) was subsequently reached on 15 
December and Germany accepted it immediately. Whereas economic and political 
interests had trumped ideational considerations related to the Franco-German friendship 
in 1992, concerns about the latter again figured prominently in German decision making 
and diplomacy in 1993. Considering that clarification in reality meant renegotiations, 
which could jeopardise the Uruguay Round, Germany can be regarded as having taken 
enormous risks for the sake of its friendship with France. This is not to say, however, 
that economic and political interests were ignored altogether. Germany remained 
adamant in its determination to reach a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 
While in 1992 the Germans were convinced that disagreement on agriculture was the 
chief obstacle to a GATT deal and that the Blair House Accord would remove this hurdle, 
in 1993 they came to realise that French resistance to the agricultural deal (e.g. their 
threat of veto) was the main barrier to achieving a deal. Thus, paradoxically, the policy 
option of appeasing the French seemed both a necessary condition for and a potential 
risk in achieving a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round. The combination of its 
political and economic interests and the importance of the Franco-German friendship 
explains how Germany devised a policy of appeasing the French, while at the same time 
attempting to secure a GATT agreement before the December 1993 deadline.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The theoretical discussion and empirical analysis in this article contributes to the debate 
on EU external trade policy in general and the role of member state preference formation 
in particular. Theoretically, it adds ideational variables to the explanation of trade policy, 
in which field material explanations are dominant. Empirically, it complements the 
existing, but relatively scarce, research on the influence of interest groups with respect 
to EU external trade policy, by focusing on how domestic interest group’s influenced 
domestic preference formation in Germany. The case study conducted here, shows how 
an empirical focus on preference formation provides insights into the wider process of 
European trade policy making (and the developments in international trade 
negotiations), which could not have been gained by an exclusive focus on the level of EU 
decision making. The latter would show that France and Germany delayed EU decision 
making, but would not provide a full explanation for why these states defended their 
protectionist preferences. Considering the continued role of member states in EU 
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external trade policy, a better understanding of how member state preferences are 
formed is imperative. 
This analysis provides new insights into this specific process by explaining German 
preference formation through an interest-based approach. It was shown that a 
combination of material (political and economic) and ideational considerations guided 
German preference formation. Where the imperatives, based on the different 
considerations, coincided, concerns regarding the Franco-German friendship 
strengthened the government’s resolve and provided legitimacy for the selected course 
of action. Thus, ideational interests and a balance of domestic interests tending towards 
the position defended by the agricultural lobby explain why Germany opposed the 
Commission proposal in 1990. When ideational imperatives ran counter to its political 
and economic interests in 1992, however, Germany eventually chose to defend its own 
material interests and accepted the Blair House Accord. Once it became clear in 1993 
that France was likely to block a GATT deal if this agreement was not amended, Kohl 
decided it was better to placate the French, not only to maintain the Franco-German 
friendship and French cooperation on other European policies, but also simply to ensure 
that the long-awaited GATT agreement gained approval in the Council of Ministers. It is 
thus only by taking account of both material and ideational interests that the German 
preferences during the Uruguay Round can be adequately explained. 
With respect to the Franco-German friendship, this study shows that it was an ever-
present consideration in German preference formation. Even if it did not influence the 
final outcome of the German preference decisively, then at least deviating from its 
imperatives required explanation during the preference-formation process. Especially 
when a governmental leader, like Kohl in this case, valued or internalised the ideational 
factors considered, these ideas proved to have a decisive impact on the German 
position. As far as the domestic pressure exerted by different interest groups is 
concerned, the case study shows that governmental sensitivity does indeed increase the 
influence of domestic actors, particularly of those actors providing grass roots support 
for the governing coalition, whereas a lack of domestic pressure provides the 
government with more freedom of manoeuvre. These outcomes provide scope conditions 
— applicable to more cases than just the German one – under which certain variables 
may be expected to be more or less influential in a domestic preference-formation 
process. Further empirical research is necessary to establish whether similar explanatory 
logics operate in preference-formation processes in other EU member states. 
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1 In the theoretical section, when referring to the organisation in general, I will use the denomination 
EU, but in the empirical section, describing events before 1993, I refer to European Economic 
Community (EEC). 
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2 It is argued, however, that member state control through this committee should not be overstated, 
because the trade experts on the committee ‘tend to be socialized as an “epistemic community’”, as a 
result of which it operates ‘as a “policy collaborator” rather than a body supervising the Commission’ 
(Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 69, in Orbie 2007: 40). 
3 Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis (1999: 480) as well as Adrian Van der Hoven (2002: 6) also 
point out this practice of consensus decision making in the Council. 
4 The author would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing her attention to this particular 
debate. 
5 The principal-agent literature provides more reasons for why member states have delegated their 
autonomy with regard to external trade policy to the EU. Delegating trade negotiating authority to the 
Commission enables the EU to speak with one voice, strengthening the negotiators’ credibility. 
Furthermore, delegation enables the EU to ‘exploit a market power that is much greater than would have 
been achieved separately by each member state’ (Kerremans 2004: 365). 
6 It is further argued that the collusive delegation hypothesis suffers from theoretical shortcomings. 
First, why would politicians delegate authority with the aim of enabling more liberal policies? The long-
term welfare gains from trade liberalization should be ‘close to irrelevant for their short-term electoral 
success’ (Dür 2008: 30). Second, it is questionable whether politicians consistently share more liberal 
preferences than interest groups, particularly when one takes into account that ‘societal actors can also 
influence the selection of policy-makers’ (Dür 2008: 30). 
7 This also implies that I assume that governments are not merely conveyor belts for the preferences of 
domestic interest groups, but that they have their own interests and preferences. It is important to note 
that this deviates from the assumption, much applied in the interest approach and liberal theories, that 
governments and politicians do not have their own interests and preferences independent of societal 
actors. 
8 See for example, Banchoff (1999), Finnemore (1996) and Katzenstein (1996). I only focus on the 
effects of given state identities on state preferences, without problematising the concept of identity itself 
(Ruggie 1998), and will thus not investigate the prior construction of these identities. 
9 It should be noted here that the Franco-German friendship indeed was not only “constraining” for 
Germany, but also “enabling”, if only because German initiatives in European decision making were 
more palatable if introduced as a Franco-German initiative (Bulmer and Paterson 1996: 28). 
10 BArch. B102: 271993. 7 September1982. Bund Deutscher Industrie. Stellungnahme der Industrie zur 
GATT-Ministerkonferenz im November, 1982; BArch. B102: 271994. 1 October 1984. Bund Deutscher 
Industrie. Stellungnahme zu einer neuen Verhandlungsrunde zur liberalisierung des Welthandels. 
11 BArch. B102: 271991 7 March 1984. Ministry of Economics. Leiterin der Abteilung V. Informelle 
Ministerrunde zur Vorbereitung einer neuen ‘Reagan-Runde’. 
12 Although France was one of the most competitive producers of agricultural goods within the EEC, it 
could not compete in the world agricultural market without the export restitutions (subsidies) provided 
under the CAP (Delorme 1994: 41). While French agriculture was highly dependent on export 
restitutions, the relatively small and inefficient German farms were dependent on high guarantee prices 
and barely needed export restitutions. 
13 BArch. B102 292882 4 June1985. Ministry of Economics. Handelsministerkonferenz Stockholm, 8-10 
Juni 1985. Agrarfragen. 
14 ArchEZ. WA-BEB-55. Ministry of Economics. Verslag van de vergadering van art. 113 (leden) op 12 
November 1982. 
15 Germany focused on bilateral talks with France, during which it tried to convince its partner that a 
new GATT round was also in the French interest. It was only at this level that soft pressure was exerted 
however: during negotiations in the Council of Ministers Germany remained cautious about pressurising 
the French openly. 
16 Frans Engering was Director General for Foreign Economic Relations at the Dutch Ministry of 
Economics and attended these negotiations. 
17 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 10/137. 14 May 1985, 10163. 
18 BArch. B102 292882 1 July 1985. Ministry of Economics. V A 5. Verhältnis EG/USA. Gesprächsziel: 
Frankreich bewusst machen, dass seinen Interessen langfristig am besten durch eine weltoffene 
Handelspolitik gedient ist. 
19 See for example: BArch B 102 292882 1 July 1985. Ministry of Economics. E/IV C. Gespräch von BM 
Dr.Bangemann mit Frau Minister Cresson am 8. Juli 1985 in Paris. Assuming that France would use the 
strained US-EEC relations as an argument for the claim that a new GATT round was not expedient, 
Germany would endorse that these tensions were manifest, but use them as another reason why GATT 
negotiations were indeed important: to counter US unilateral actions. 
20 Dr. Lorenz Schomerus was Director General for Trade Policy at the German Ministry of Economics. 
21 Deutscher Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 10/323 25 September 1986, 17998. 
22 CAC 19930192. 9 October 1990, Communiqué de Premier Ministre; CAC 19920056, 16 October 1990, 
Conseil agricole, Intervention de M. Mermaz. The US was of the opinion that the Commission proposal, 
before a watered-down version of it had even been accepted by the member states, was a ‘non-starter: 
too little too late’. Considering that the US was offering 70 to 90 per cent reductions, this was not 
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surprising (ArchBuZa 26 September 1990. wasi762/19192. Coded message from the Dutch embassy in 
Washington to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
23 CAC. 19920056, art 8, 2 November 1990. Diplomatic telegram from the French embassy in Bonn. 
Objet: UR préparation du conseil du 5 novembre 1990. 
24 Dr. Franz-Josef Feiter was Director General for Agriculture at the Chancellor’s Office. 
25 ArchBUZa. VN/1985-1994: 08640. 24 October 1990. Telex from the Dutch Ministry of Economics to 
the Dutch permanent representation in Bonn. 
26 CAC 19920056, art. 8 24.10.1990. Bernard Vial. Ministry of Agriculture. Note pour Monsieur le 
Ministre. 
27 ArchBuZa. DDI DIE ARA: 1012 26.10.1990. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of International 
Economic Relations. Memorandum: Verslag Landbouwraad. 
28 BArch. B102: 736231. 2 November 1990. Ministry of Economics. V A 2. Sprechzettel. This document 
clearly shows that the French position was of particular importance to Germany, but in the end it 
concluded that it would not be in Germany’s interest to support a continued French rejection of the 
Commission proposal. 
29 The reasons for this change in Kohl’s priorities may be that governmental sensitivity had decreased in 
1991 as no major elections were due in the near future. Further, a successful conclusion of the 
negotiations, and the economic advantages associated with it, became increasingly important as the 
costs of German unification were proving to be far higher than foreseen (Der Spiegel 15 April 1991; 13 
May 1991). 
30 BArch. N1436: 21. 21 January 1992. Telex from the German embassy in Paris to the German Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. 
31 Wirtschaftswoche (13 November 1992) even argued that it was Kohl’s Nibelungentreu an Mitterrand 
that had caused the collapse of the bilateral negotiations in early November, a few weeks before the 
Blair House Accord was reached. The US had also complained that Kohl was prioritizing the interests of 
his farmers and his friend Mitterrand over Germany’s wider economic interests (Financial Times 6 March 
1992; 18 March 1992). 
32 ArchEZ. GATT-UR 1990-1993. Soc 1-199. 3 September 1993. Informal bilateral German-Dutch 
debriefing on high-level Franco-German consultations. 
33 CUEAC 8409/93, GATT 134, AGRICORG 261. 1 September 1993. Note from the French delegation. 
Subject: Blair House Agreement. 
34 It is questionable though whether France would actually have vetoed a final GATT deal, as such a deal 
would not only include agriculture but also other economic sectors. Losses in the agricultural sector 
could be offset by gains in other sectors. It is this package deal character of the final GATT agreement 
and the Commission’s prerogative to refuse voting on separate parts of the overall deal that provided 
the Commission with some freedom of manoeuvre relative to the member states. 
35 ArchBuZa. DDI-DIE ARA: 1763. 4 February 1993. J. Douma. Message from the Dutch embassy in 
Bonn to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
36 ArchBuZa. DDI-DIE ARA: 1763. 3.9.1993 boni 300/15691. 10 September 1993 brei 075/5829. 
Messages from the Dutch Embassy in Bonn to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
37 Johannes Ludewig was Director General for Economic and Financial Affairs at the Chancellor’s Office. 
38 Interviews with Feiter 21 May 2007; Schomerus 29 March 2007; Ludewig 5 April 2007. See also 
Meunier (2005: 118). 
39 ArchBuZa. DDI DIE ARA 1763 8 September 1993. brei 313/15939. Message from the Dutch Embassy 
in Bonn to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The monetary crisis worried the Germans, as it 
endangered the European system of ‘green currencies’ used in intra-European agricultural trade. 
German agriculture profited from this system, because it kept agricultural prices in Germany relatively 
high compared to prices in other member states. 
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